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Abstract
Already in 1835 Lobachevski entertained the possibility of multiple (one might say
“rival”) geometries of the same type playing a role. This idea of rival geometries has
reappeared from time to time (including Poincare´ and several 20th century authors)
but had yet to become a key idea in space-time philosophy prior to Brown’s Physical
Relativity. Such ideas are emphasized towards the end of Brown’s book, which I suggest
as the interpretive key. A crucial difference between Brown’s constructivist approach
to space-time theory and orthodox “space-time realism” pertains to modal scope. Con-
structivism takes a broad modal scope in applying (at least) to all local classical field
theories—modal cosmopolitanism, one might say, including theories with multiple ge-
ometries. By contrast the orthodox view is modally provincial in assuming that there
exists a unique geometry, as the familiar theories (Newtonian gravity, Special Relativ-
ity, Nordstro¨m’s gravity, and Einstein’s General Relativity) have. These theories serve
as the “canon” for the orthodox view. Their historical roles also suggest a Whiggish
story of inevitable progress. Physics literature after c. 1920 is relevant to orthodoxy
primarily as commentary on the canon, which closed in the 1910s. The orthodox view
explains the spatio-temporal behavior of matter in terms of the manifestation of the
real geometry of space-time, an explanation works fairly well within the canon. The
orthodox view, Whiggish history, and the canon have a symbiotic relationship.
If one happens to philosophize about a theory outside the canon, space-time real-
ism sheds little light on the spatio-temporal behavior of matter. Worse, it gives the
wrong answer when applied to an example arguably within the canon, a sector of Spe-
cial Relativity, namely, massive scalar gravity with universal coupling. Which is the
true geometry—the flat metric from the Poincare´ symmetry group, the conformally
flat metric exhibited by material rods and clocks, or both—or is the question faulty?
∗To appear in the special issue of Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics on Harvey Brown’s
Physical Relativity 10 years later.
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How does space-time realism explain the fact that all matter fields see the same curved
geometry, when so many ways to mix and match exist? Constructivist attention to
dynamical details is vindicated; geometrical shortcuts can disappoint. The more ex-
haustive exploration of relativistic field theories in particle physics, especially massive
theories, is a largely untapped resource for space-time philosophy.
1 Introduction
Already in 1835 Lobachevski proposed that there might be more than one geometry that
plays a role in one and the same real world.
We cognize directly in nature only motion, without which all the impressions our
senses receive become impossible. All other ideas, for example geometric, though
tied up implicitly in the properties of motion, are artificial products of our minds;
and consequently space, by its own self, abstractly, for us does not exist. After
that, there is no contradiction in our mind when we admit that certain natural
forces obey the laws of a certain geometry, while others are governed by the laws
of another geometry particular to them. [Lobachevski, 1897, Russian original
1835]
It might be worthwhile to present another translation of a portion of this passage: “. . . there
can be no contradiction if we assume that certain forces in nature follow one geometry,
and others a different geometry” [Logunov and Folomeshkin, 1977]. The idea of multiple
geometries in one theory is a crucial idea that alters the big picture of space-time philosophy
and is a matter of current mainstream physics research [Akrami et al., 2015].
It turns out that Lobachevski’s book was translated into English and published already
in the 19th century [Lobachevski, 1897], although not in the most prominent location (the
Neomon, Austin, Texas, across the street from the university). Translator George Bruce Hal-
sted later translated Poincare´’s works [Poincare´, 1913]. Halsted’s comments in the “Trans-
lator’s Preface” (appearing at the end of the work, judging by the Yale scan) show his
recognition of the value of this portion of Lobachevski’s idea here:
it is preeminently in his “New Principles” that the great Russian allows free
expression to his profound philosophic insight, which on the one hand shatters
forever Kant’s doctrine of our absolute a priori knowledge of fundamental spatial
properties, while on the other hand emphasizing the essential relativity of space.
Lobachevski’s position is still after sixty years the final philosophy. No one has
gone beyond it. [Lobachevski, 1897]
Curiously enough, Lobachevski still has something to teach has not sixty but 180 years later.
The possibility of matter coupling to two metrics at once is considered. . . .matter
can couple to two distinct metrics. Consequently, the traditional notion of
a ‘physical metric’ may have to be discarded, leaving us faced with entirely
new conceptual challenges in interpreting even the observables of the theory.
[Akrami et al., 2015]
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A search of WorldCat suggests that this translation was not reproduced widely enough
to make much impact. Evidently there is one copy outside the USA (University of London)
besides the ten copies in the USA (Arizona, Southern California, Yale, Boston Athenaeum,
Brandeis, New Mexico State, Columbia, Syracuse, Brown, and, naturally, the University of
Texas at Austin). It is easy to see how such a work could stay obscure, though I haven’t ruled
out the possibility that there is some other means of access to this idea of Lobachevski’s.
Fortunately Yale has digitized the work and put it online.
Until recently the possibility of rival geometries, multiple geometric structures of the same
type (e.g., metrics, volume elements, or the like), seemed to originate first with Poincare´
[Ben-Menahem, 2001, p. 489] [Pitts, 2016b]. The key passage, fairly familiar but easy to
overlook, runs as follows:
Suppose, for example, that we have a great sphere of radius R and that the
temperature decreases from the center to the surface of this sphere according to
the law of which I have spoken in describing the non-Euclidean world.
We might have bodies whose expansion would be negligible and which would
act like ordinary rigid solids; and, on the other hand, bodies very dilatable and
which would act like non-Euclidean solids. We might have two double pyramids
OABCDEFGH and O′A′B′C ′D′E ′F ′G′H ′ and two triangles αβγ and α′β ′γ′.
The first double pyramid might be rectilinear and the second curvilinear; the
triangle αβγ might be made of inexpansible matter and the other of a very
dilatable matter.
It would then be possible to make the first observations with the double pyramid
OAH and the triangle αβγ, and the second with the double pyramid O′A′H ′
and the triangle α′β ′γ′. And then experiment would seem to prove first that the
Euclidean geometry is true and then that it is false.
Experiments therefore have a bearing, not on space, but on bodies.
[Poincare´, 1913, pp. 88, 89] (emphasis in the original)
Crucially, the idea in both Lobachevski and Poincare´ is that both geometries actually do
some observable work directly; more specifically, there is some type of matter (Lobachevski)
or token of matter (Poincare´) that exhibits each geometry chronogeometrically. Such works
contrast with another use of a bimetric formalism, namely in Nathan Rosen’s modification of
General Relativity [Rosen, 1940], which posits a flat background metric that is unobservable.1
Such merits as Rosen’s idea has are more subtle, especially providing resources for engineering
a consistent notion of causality, avoiding a chicken-and-the-egg problem that afflicts quantum
gravity [Pitts and Schieve, 2004]. Chris Isham has commented on this problem:
For example, in the Wheeler-DeWitt approach, the configuration variable of the
system is the Riemannian metric qab(x) on a three-manifold Σ, and the canonical
commutation relations invariably include the set
[qˆab(x), qˆcd(x
′)] = 0 (1)
1Curiously, the second of the two Rosen papers seems to envisage some local empirical consequences; that
suggestion was mistaken.
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for all points x and x′ in Σ. In normal canonical quantum field theory such a
relation arises because Σ is a space-like subset of spacetime, and hence the fields
at x and x′ should be simultaneously measurable. But how can such a relation
be justified in a theory that has no fixed causal structure? The problem is rarely
mentioned but it means that, in this respect, the canonical approach to quantum
gravity is no better than the covariant one. It is another aspect of the ‘problem
of time’ . . . . [Isham, 1994] (p. 12)
But there is at least one other way to have two metrics in a theory, one that arises naturally
in some potentially fundamental physics theories, in which all matter sees one geometry, but
the gravitational laws subtly display a different geometry, as will appear below.
Differential geometry was still quite immature when Einstein developed General Relativ-
ity. For example, the connection had not yet been identified as in principle independent of
a metric, potentially containing properties that go beyond a metric (torsion) or exhibiting
a relation of not really fitting with some particular metric (non-metricity [Schouten, 1954])
and perhaps not with any metric [Edgar, 1991, Edgar, 1992, Pitts, 2016b]. As differential
geometry matured in the late 1910s and 1920s, it was recognized by Levi-Civita that, e.g.,
there was no reason that a manifold must have only one metric.
There is clearly no reason against assigning in turn to the same analytical man-
ifold two distinct metrical determinations, defined by the two quadratic forms
[footnote suppressed]
ds2 =
n∑
1 ik
aikdxidxk, ...(1)
ds′2 =
n∑
1 ik
a′ikdxidxk, ...(1
′)
[Levi-Civita, 1926, p. 220].
If there is no reason that a manifold should have only one metric, then there is no reason
not to entertain such possibilities in physical theorizing.
2 Two Metrics, One Directly Observable, One Indi-
rectly
An interesting possibility, plausible in fundamental physics, is when there are two geome-
tries in a theory, one of them encodes the behavior of (all) rods and clocks, and the other is
indirectly observable, though not because any rods or clocks give it chronogeometric signifi-
cance. One generally doesn’t expect to find deep philosophy of geometry in the Astrophysical
Journal, but one should be glad for exceptions. A prima facie plausible philosophy of geom-
etry for bimetric massive variants of (i.e., rivals to) General Relativity was outlined clearly
by Freund, Maheshwari and Schonberg in the late 1960s in connection with their massive
spin-2 gravitational theory [Freund et al., 1969]. It differs from Einstein’s theory by adding
a graviton mass term, a part in the Lagrangian density involving algebraic quadratic (and
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perhaps higher) terms in the gravitational potential. The field equations thus receive a lin-
ear algebraic term (and perhaps higher terms). The gravitational potential is basically the
difference between the metric gµν and some background metric ηµν .
2 The graviton mass term
takes the form
m2
16piG
∫
d4x(
√−g +√−η − 1
2
√−ggµνηµν), (2)
One could make a perturbative expansion to express this mass term in terms of quadratic
and higher terms in the gravitational potential. I will not do so here, partly because
such expansions introduce questions of field redefinitions that tend to obscure the empir-
ical/chronogeometric significance of the quantities.3
Freund, Maheshwari and Schonberg were very clear about many aspects of the physical
meaning of their two metrics:
a) Breakdown of Geometrical Interpretation
The theory, not being generally covariant, cannot be interpreted geometrically.
This means first of all that the quadratic form,
dσ2 = gµνdx
µdxν ,
has nothing to do with the line element of the world geometry, which remains
ds2 = ηµνdx
µdxν .
Similarly, the equations of motion of matter (25) still look formally as if they
were geodesic equations. As a matter of fact, they are not. Indeed, the Γσµν
are given by the usual expressions, but gµν and. . . [its inverse] are determined
from the not-generally-covariant equations (28), so that the Γσµν are not genuine
Christoffel symbols. The geometrical interpretation is one of the crucial steps in
applications of Einstein’s theory. What do we offer as a replacement? The field
equations (28) and the equations of motion for matter (25) fully determine the
answer to any question one can ask. For that matter, this is true for Einstein’s
theory as well. There, however, geometrical considerations may be used as a
luxurious shortcut toward the answers to many problems.
2In fact Freund, Maheshwari and Schonberg in fact used the matrix diag(−1, 1, 1, 1) rather than a flat
background metric tensor. Thus they avoided formal general covariance in favor of preferred Cartesian
coordinates adapted to the flat background. Introducing a flat background metric tensor ηµν (with a
component transformation law), not just a matrix diag(−1, 1, 1, 1), puts the theory in a more familiar form
for foundational purposes and exposes two metrics in the theory.
3Should one define the gravitational potential using gµν−ηµν , or gµν −
√−ηηµν where gµν = √−ggµν , or
what [Boulware and Deser, 1972]? Of course fundamentally it doesn’t matter as long as one keeps track of
what one means. There are practical advantages for one choice or another in calculations, but these vary with
context: gµν − ηµν leads to simpler Hamiltonian treatments, whereas gµν −
√−ηηµν leads to simpler wave
equations [Papapetrou, 1948], and certain fractional-weight definitions make the vacuum General Relativity
Lagrangian polynomial [DeWitt, 1967], namely, (−g) 518 gµν − (−η) 518 ηµν or (−g)− 522 gµν − (−η)− 522 ηµν . How
one would express DeWitt’s quantities using the resources of modern geometry is worth reflection. Most
other choices have no particular advantages in any context.
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b) Local Problems
If our theory is different from Einstein’s, does this mean that it conflicts with
the classical tests of the latter? No. All classical tests are local, i.e., they involve
only small regions of space and time. Locally our theory differs from that of
Einstein only by terms of the order (radius of system/Hubble radius), so that the
corrections are indeed negligible and the local tests cannot distinguish between
the two theories. Moreover, locally one can reinstate an approximate geometrical
interpretation.. . . Thus at a local level our theory is indistinguishable by usual
experiments from that of Einstein. The real difference appears for systems of the
size of Λ−
1
2 , that is, for cosmological problems. [Freund et al., 1969]
Before long it was argued that important problems of detail afflict not only the
Freund-Maheshwari-Schonberg theory, but all similar theories [van Dam and Veltman, 1970,
van Dam and Veltman, 1972, Boulware and Deser, 1972]. Some of those arguments were
later criticized [Deffayet et al., 2002, de Rham et al., 2011, Hassan and Rosen, 2012], with
ongoing debate [Deser and Waldron, 2013]. Such issues are relevant to whether it is epis-
temically possible for us now that such a theory is true of the actual world. If one is interested
only in whether theories with similar features are metaphysically possible, and epistemically
possible as of the 1910s rather than 2016, then one can use a massive scalar theory instead
[Pitts, 2011b, Pitts, 2011a, Pitts, 2016b], doing to Nordstro¨m’s theory what Hugo von Seel-
iger and Carl Neumann in the 1890s had done and Einstein in 1917 [Einstein, 1923] would
do to Newton’s theory. Hence the general philosophical idea of Freund, Maheshwari and
Schonberg manifestly could be realized for scalar gravity theories, whether or not it could
be for tensor theories such as they considered.
Related points have been made in the philosophical literature [Weinstein, 1996] using
Brans-Dicke scalar-tensor gravitational theory. In such theories, there is one metric that
rods and clocks exhibit chronogeometrically (the “Jordan frame,” because the theory is then
formulated much as in Jordan’s original work before Brans-Dicke), whereas a different metric
(the “Einstein frame,” conformally related to the other one) provides a simple picture of the
gravitational dynamics. The physics literature at times has suffered from a debate about
which metric is the real metric. Some authors prudently made the conventionalist proposal
that there is no fact of the matter [Faraoni and Nadeau, 2007]. Why would such a question
need a context-independent answer?
3 Reading Physical Relativity Starting at the End
Presumably many readers read Brown’s Physical Relativity starting at the beginning. That
is the natural thing to do with books, especially for diligent readers who plan to read the
whole book. I suspect that most reviewers have read the book the same way.
While this style of reading is natural, it has a disadvantage in approaching a book such
some of the key points for good reasons come at the end. Physical Relativity is such a
book. In terms of both chronology and difficulty, one comes to Special Relativity before
General Relativity. While one might recognize the importance of a dynamical approach
based on studying General Relativity or even other theories, one might still feel constrained
to write about Special Relativity first. It isn’t so easy to make clear why one must take
6
a dynamical/constructive approach to Special Relativity, though Brown does a good job
arguing the point. But once one has seen the big picture from the end of the work, where
the discussions of non-minimal coupling in General Relativity (pp. 165-172) and of multi-
geometry theories such as Bekenstein’s TeVeS (pp. 172-176), it becomes clear that the point
is generic. Hence Special Relativity is a degenerate case. In fact all the familiar cases on
which space-time philosophy dwells, Newton, Special Relativity, (if the writer has historical
interests) Nordstro¨m’s scalar theory, and General Relativity, are all examples of a happy
degeneration, namely, there are no rival geometrical structures in their usual formulations.4
Space-time has a unique spatial metric and a unique temporal metric (or a unique spatio-
temporal metric), and a unique affine connection (though admittedly there is an issue of
choice regarding Newtonian gravity, still one doesn’t need both at the same time).
My own way of reading Brown’s work was initially more a matter of reading the table of
contents for parts that sounded especially fascinating (such as the last chapter, 9, “The View
from General Relativity,” and the adjacent appendix A “Einstein on General Covariance”
and some other parts). This approach, while not ideal in general, in this case had the
advantage of making it easier to view the whole with an emphasis on what I take to be key
points made near the end. By contrast generally reviews have not had much to say about
the last chapter and first appendix. While failing to criticize perhaps the best part of the
book counts for something, one could wish for recognizing the best part rather than passing
over it in silence. Likely reviewers’ opinions of the book were largely fixed by the time they
reached these last parts of the book. The entrenchment of the canon in space-time philosophy
is so strong that the concluding parts of the book were apparently too little, too late for
most reviewers to overcome modal provincialism, the assumption that the whole realm of
interesting theories that space-time philosophy should consider is basically like the familiar
theories. In my view, issues of non-minimal coupling and theories with rival geometries
should govern one’s overall view in order to achieve a modally cosmopolitan view.
4 Should Space-time Philosophy Have a Canon?
At least until recently, English literature was thought to have a canon, a collection of the
most important works that everyone should know and that provide a standard against which
all others can be measured. Evidently this fact itself is not as old as it might seem. But the
idea of a literary canon and its analogs provide a useful model for contemplating space-time
philosophy.
The normative sense of canon has been strongly reinforced by the application
of the term to the accepted books of the Bible, though there is no agreement
on the original force of the word even in this application. [footnote suppressed]
[Harris, 1991]
Harris writes in a field where the idea of a literary canon is very familiar, albeit contested
in various ways, and where the Biblical parallel has been arguably overstated.
4One noteworthy exception [Earman, 1989] is organized not so much around actual theories as around
aspirations for theories during the 17th-19th centuries.
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Though the sense of “unquestionably and uniquely authoritative” that belongs to
the biblical canon (and to the theologically derived endorsements and prohibitions
churches enforce on members of their faith) continually colors the debate over the
modern literary canon, the analogy is more dramatic than helpful. [Harris, 1991]
But are there fields in which a canon operates de facto but unrecognized and where calling
attention to the parallel is illuminating?
The utility of calling attention to a de facto canon is all the more plausible if a field con-
tains a prophet(s). Pais’s scientific biography of Einstein is useful in that respect. Pais finds
“the parallels with the rituals of beatification and canonization compelling. . . ” and portrays
a joint meeting of the Royal Society and the Royal Astronomical Society on November 6, 1919
as a canonization ceremony [Pais, 1982, p. 305]. This behavior of two royal societies was,
of course, not just the extravagance of the popular press, though the latter was important.
Pais attempts both to describe and explain the place that Einstein came to occupy.
The essence of Einstein’s unique position goes deeper and has everything to do, it
seems to me, with the stars and with language. A new man appears abruptly, the
‘suddenly famous Doctor Einstein.’ He carries the message of a new order in the
universe. He is a new Moses come down from the mountain to bring the law and
a new Joshua controlling the motion of heavenly bodies. He speaks in strange
tongues but wise men aver that the stars testify to his veracity.. . . Behold, a new
man appears. His mathematical language is sacred yet amenable to transcription
into the profane: the fourth dimension, stars are not where they seemed to be but
nobody need worry, light has weight, space is warped. He fulfills two profound
needs in man, the need to know and the need not to know but to believe. The
drama of his emergence is enhanced (though this to me seems secondary) by the
coincidence—itself caused largely by the vagaries of war—between the meeting
of the joint societies and the first annual remembrance of horrid events of the
recent past which had caused millions to die, empires to fall, the future to be
certain. The new man who appears at that time represents order and power. He
becomes the . . . the divine man, of the twentieth century. [Pais, 1982, p. 311]
Is all this hagiography something above which philosophers have risen? Consider any
famous physicist besides Einstein (or Newton in his day)—say, Pauli, Landau, Feynman,
Dirac, or the like. One will not find nearly the same kind of anti-anti-Pauli, or anti-anti-
Landau, etc. reflex if the idea of disagreeing or moving beyond one of these giants is en-
tertained. While such criticisms have a good chance of being unwise, they are not nearly
so automatically embarrassing and shameful. It is doubtless relevant that Einstein endured
unusually much criticism that was stupid and/or malicious, some if it from philosophers,
partly because he was famous and his work touched on issues of widespread interest with
entrenched views. While we do not want to be associated with stupid or malicious criti-
cism (embarrassing ourselves and the discipline), it is not necessary in 2016 to continue to
prove our credentials (that unlike Bergson and Dingler, we are free of such defects as un-
revisable a priori philosophy of time and/or space and, in the latter case, ties to National
Socialism) by attending to Einstein’s theory almost exclusively as a lasting and perpetual
achievement far beyond what physicists have been doing for the last 15+ years in the wake
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of dark energy. Besides huge amounts of work in the physics literature that could lead
to replacing General Relativity, in some cases with a merely Poincare´-invariant theory (e.g.,
[de Rham et al., 2011, Hassan and Rosen, 2012]) rather than a generally covariant one, there
has been since 2009 even substantial discussion of the idea that one can achieve a renor-
malizable theory of quantum gravity by rejecting even Special Relativity in favor of absolute
simultaneity [Horˇava, 2009]. This work has been cited well over 1000 times. If one does not
like these examples, even scalar-tensor theories, presumably as covariant as anyone could
want, make the same multi-geometry point [Weinstein, 1996], which nevertheless keeps get-
ting lost. Will philosophers acquire the self-confidence to stop trying to prove our orthodoxy
more zealously than the scientists who know at least as much about space-time as we do?
Brown reached that stage in 2005 by philosophizing about extra-canonical works such as
TeVeS.
Some related developments are worth mentioning. A number of the leading histori-
ans of General Relativity, after looking at Einstein’s unpublished as well as published
works through 1915, have concluded that Einstein found the definitive field equations by
a more physical and less mysterious process than has been thought [Renn and Sauer, 1999,
Janssen, 2005, Renn, 2005b, Renn, 2005a, Janssen and Renn, 2007, Renn and Sauer, 2007].
This long-neglected “physical strategy” bears a strong resemblance to the later particle
physics tradition [Pitts, 2016a]. Einstein apparently re-wrote his own history partly in order
to justify his decreasingly appreciated unified field theory quest [van Dongen, 2010]. More
broadly focussed work now places Einstein within his generation [Staley, 2009]. The idea
that physics is being distorted by learning the wrong lessons from faulty history is being
suggested by a leading physicist [Smolin, 2015]. Finally, Einstein’s treatment of conserva-
tion laws and their connection to symmetries, far from being prescient, was not even viable
or well informed of old or recent results [Pitts, 2016a]. Hence a variety of authors have re-
cently worked toward de-privileging the mystical (and mythical) Einstein. The propriety of
a dynamical approach to space-time philosophy is thus confirmed from other directions.
5 Norton’s Space-time Realism
One review of Physical Relativity deserves special attention [Norton, 2008]. That is partly
because its title “Why Constructive Relativity Fails” might give the reader the impression
that constructive relativity fails, and partly because it provides such a clearly stated alter-
native that can be evaluated. Norton is quite correct that Brown does not construct every
notion in sight, but how crucial is that [Stevens, 2015]?
After all, the project was to reduce chronogeometric facts to symmetries, not
to recover the entire spatiotemporal nature of the world from no spatiotemporal
assumptions whatsoever. The constructivist’s project might need a primitive
notion of “being contiguous”, but Norton is wrong to think that it follows from
this that constructivists are illicitly committed to the independent existence of
spacetime. [footnote suppressed] [Pooley, 2013, p. 573]
In any case Norton has provided a useful service toward identifying a large core of overlap
between constructivists like Brown and space-time realists.
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Let us recall at some length what Norton calls the “Realist conception of Minkowski
spacetime” [Norton, 2008]. (Evidently Norton takes this example to be sufficiently general to
indicate how space-time realism would apply to other theories as well—a crucial assumption.
The modest role for physics literature after c. 1920 for understanding space-time realism is
evident.)
(1) There exists a four-dimensional spacetime that can be coordinatized by a set
of standard coordinates (x, y, z, t), related by the Lorentz transformation.
(2) The spatiotemporal interval s between events (x, y, z, t) and (X, Y, Z, T ) along
a straight [footnote suppressed] line connecting them is a property of the space-
time, independent of the matter it contains, and is given by
s2 = (t− T )2 − (x−X)2 − (y − Y )2 − (z − Z)2. (1)
When s2 > 0, the interval s corresponds to times elapsed on an ideal clock; when
s2 < 0, the interval s corresponds to spatial distances measured by ideal rods
(both employed in the standard way).
(3) Material clocks and rods measure these times and distances because the laws
of the matter theories that govern them are adapted to the independent geometry
of this spacetime.
If constructivism is to be novel, it must contradict this view; it certainly cannot
covertly presume all or most of it.
What I will seek to establish below is that if constructivism is to succeed, it must
tacitly presume at least a major part of this realist conception. [Norton, 2008]
My concerns are with (2) and (3). Concerning (2), the definite article and singular noun
in “[t]he . . . interval” are worrisome. They suggest that Norton’s analysis has not been honed
with examples lacking One True Geometry in mind. The space-time realist has an unfaced
task, to give a plausible story outside the canon, as Brown’s constructivism clearly does
[Brown, 2005, Butterfield, 2007].
6 Massive Scalar Gravity vs. Space-time Realism
More definitively troublesome is the fact, that Norton’s (3) is false even within what is pre-
sumably a sector of Special Relativity, namely, universally coupled massive scalar gravity,
which is just Poincare´-invariant. These theories, though they have roots in the 1890s in the
work of Seeliger and Neumann, and would have gravity satisfy the rather familiar Klein-
Gordon equation in the lowest approximation, have hardly ever been studied thoroughly,
especially for philosophical lessons, until recently [Pitts, 2011a, Pitts, 2011b, Pitts, 2016b].
One cannot assume that physicists have already done all the work that philosophy re-
quires. The Freund-Nambu paper [Freund and Nambu, 1968] was a milestone, though
it doesn’t actually discuss gravity and was connected with gravity only later by others
[Deser and Halpern, 1970]. According to the universal coupling assumption, material stress-
energy and gravitational stress-energy serve as sources for gravity in the same way. That
idea was already advocated as part of Einstein’s “physical strategy” in 1913.
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These equations satisfy a requirement that, in our opinion, must be imposed on
a relativity theory of gravitation; that is to say, they show that the tensor θµν
of the gravitational field acts as a field generator in the same way as the tensor
Θµν of the material processes. An exceptional position of gravitational energy in
comparison with all other kinds of energies would lead to untenable consequences.
[Einstein and Grossmann, 1996]
In the scalar case, only the trace of stress-energy serves as such a source. It is
not obvious by inspection, but is nonetheless demonstrable, that as a result the mat-
ter field equations have matter coupled to an effective geometry that is curved (though
conformally flat) because the gravitational potential merges with the original volume el-
ement [Kraichnan, 1955, Freund and Nambu, 1968, Deser and Halpern, 1970, Pitts, 2011a,
Pitts, 2011b, Pitts, 2016b]. Thus the field equations follow from a Lagrangian density of
this form (with u being matter, g giving effective volumes via the effective positive vol-
ume element
√−g, ηˆµν being the unimodular Weyl-flat tensor density giving the conformal
geometry, and η being the determinant of the flat metric):
LNord[g, ηˆµν ] + Lmass[g, η] + Lmatter[g, ηˆµν , u].
The massive scalar gravitational potential is a volume-distorting almost-universal force due
to universal coupling. For massive theories, η is observable in long-range gravitational exper-
iments. So the chronogeometrically observable conformally flat metric gµν = ηˆµν(−g) 14 isn’t
clearly the One True Geometry. The mass term both reduces the symmetry group from the
15-parameter conformal group of Nordstro¨m’s theory [Norton, 1992] to the Poincare´ group
and makes the undistorted volume element
√−η indirectly observable, hence not surplus.
Therefore one cannot eliminate it as one would eliminate the original volume element in
Nordstro¨m’s theory or any analogous unobservable geometry that might have been posited
to be hidden by Lotze-Poincare´-Reichenbach universal forces.
Presumably the controversial part of Norton’s (3), the part disagreeing with Brown, was
intended to be the explanatory claim “because the laws of the matter theories that govern
them are adapted to the independent geometry of this spacetime.” But massive scalar
gravity provides an example where the empirical explanandum “[m]aterial clocks and rods
measure these times and distances” fails. Whether an explanation requires a true explanans
has been debated; one might think that Newtonian gravity is false and yet explains a lot
about falling bodies, the solar system, etc. But an explanation with a false explanandum
is another matter. One doesn’t need Minkowski space-time to explain why rods and clocks
exhibit the interval
s2 = (t− T )2 − (x−X)2 − (y − Y )2 − (z − Z)2
when they actually don’t. Instead they exhibit a position-dependent conformally flat geom-
etry due to the gravitational potential. (3) predicts that rods and clocks do something that
contradicts what the field equations say that rods and clocks do, as one can see by inspection
of the Lagrangian density
LNord[g, ηˆµν ] + Lmass[g, η] + Lmatter[g, ηˆµν , u],
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because Lmatter depends on g and does not depend on η. In such a theory, matter fields
see an effective curved (conformally flat metric) gµν , not the flat background metric ηµν .
But ηµν indeed is fully present and at least indirectly observable in the theory (and therefore
cannot be removed as gratuitous like Lotze-Poincare´-Reichenbach universal forces)—one only
needs to do sufficiently long-range gravitational experiments. Relative to Norton’s space-
time realism, constructivism is indeed novel: constructivism lacks the false explanandum
contained in (3) for the case of massive scalar gravity. In the case of massive scalar gravity,
constructivism bests realism even within the canon.
Brown’s treatment of Special Relativity/Minkowski geometry/Poincare´-invariant theories
(though perhaps one is now wary of assuming that these are all the same) requires only slight
modification consistent with the main thrusts of his work. He writes that
in special relativity, the Minkowskian metric is no more than a codification of
the behaviour of rods and clocks, or equivalently, it is no more than the Kleinian
geometry associated with the symmetry group of the quantum physics of the
non-gravitational interactions in the theory of matter. [Brown, 2005, p. 9]
Massive scalar gravity lacks Minkowskian behavior of rods and clocks, though it has the
Minkowski metric (among other things) and the Poincare´ symmetry group. Whereas massive
scalar gravity undermines the core of Norton’s view, it undermines an isolated sentence or
two of Brown’s work while showing that key points, that detailed dynamics is crucial for
explanation and that it can lead to the failure of familiar geometric shortcuts, are even more
broadly applicable than they seemed.
The question arises what to do about theories that do not have One True Geometry. This
question certainly is discussed in Brown’s book [Brown, 2005]. Strikingly, the question often
does not arise in responses to the book, much as it failed to arise in Eddington’s response
to Poincare´ 90-odd years ago [Eddington, 1920, Poincare´, 1913]. Given the emphasis placed
on such possibilities in Brown’s book, responding by reverting to Special Relativity prevents
one from interacting with one of the book’s strongest points. Perhaps reviewers have no
objection to the treatment of such theories (though how such a view would fit with the
treatment of the canon is difficult to say), or perhaps the argument has not been highlighted
sufficiently to make its importance evident, as this paper aims to do (as has another work
by Brown [Brown, 2009]).
In general, geometry isn’t very illuminating, restrictive, or explanatory; when it appears
to be, an assumption of few ingredients has been introduced. Geometry is no royal road
to physics with sufficient modal scope for the philosophy of geometry. Space-time realism
works, when it does, by assuming a special case, starting near the finish line. In that respect
space-time realism reminds one of Bertrand Russell’s remark:
The method of “postulating” what we want has many advantages; they are the
same as the advantages of theft over honest toil. Let us leave them to others and
proceed with our honest toil. [Russell, 1919, p. 71]
Space-time realism apparently has nothing to say about extra-canonical theories lacking One
True Geometry. It is modally provincial. By contrast constructivism motivated partly by
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taking seriously the possible non-existence of One True Geometry. It is modally cosmopoli-
tan, much like Lobachevski and like Poincare´’s and some subsequent authors’ conventional-
ism [Lobachevski, 1897] [Poincare´, 1913, pp. 88, 89] [Ben-Menahem, 2001, Gru¨nbaum, 1977,
Weinstein, 1996, Freund et al., 1969]. Constructivism heeds Norton’s good advice not
to impart spurious necessity to contingent claims about best theory, General Relativity
[Norton, 1993, pp. 848, 849], better than space-time realism does.
There seems to be no natural and attractive way to amend space-time realism to fix this
problem. If one decides (likely contrary to the taxonomic inclination of most physicists) that
Poincare´-invariant massive scalar gravity isn’t really part of Special Relativity, then it turns
out that space-time realism isn’t very good at figuring out which theories were part of Special
Relativity, and needs particle physics/constructivist/conventionalist examples to make that
point, which is awkward. The space-time realist’s need to address theories lacking One
True Geometry is still unresolved even if the taxonomic exclusion is made, because massive
scalar gravity, even if not part of Special Relativity or a worthy participant in Minkowski
space-time, still could have been true. Indeed it was epistemically possible and not terribly
unlikely for a time in the mid-1910s that it was actually true. Any adequate philosophy of
geometry will have to borrow a page (perhaps a chapter) from the constructivist’s attention
to detail and a broad range of possibilities and rip out a page about the adequacy of geometric
shortcuts. Poincare´ [Poincare´, 1913] could have said the same thing in reply to Eddington
[Eddington, 1920]. But Poincare´ was dead, and no one said it on his behalf. One needs not
just a list of geometric objects, but what they do in field equations. With a single metric,
General Relativity (or Nordstro¨m’s theory if conformally flat) follows uniquely (if higher
derivatives are excluded); but with more ingredients, there are more possibilities. As with
cooking, so with differential geometry: with more than one ingredient, it becomes necessary
to say something detailed about proportions.
One of the main merit’s of Brown’s work is that his views both arise from and reinforce the
habit of paying attention to extra-canonical literature. Thus he has been able to articulate
as a core theme a point that only emerged sporadically earlier, namely, the need to pay
attention to a broad range of examples, thereby to recognize how the handful of usual cases
attended in philosophy are unrepresentative special cases, to foreground the need to pay
attention to details, and, in part, to show how that philosophy applies even for a proper
understanding of at least some of those special cases.
7 Priority of Field Equation(s) over Geometry
One of the key points at issue between constructivism and orthodox space-time realism is the
question of the relative explanatory priority of geometry (the orthodox view) or the dynam-
ical laws (the dynamical/constructivist view). In General Relativity, Riemannian geometry
greatly restricts field equations. Perhaps geometry explains the field equations? General Rel-
ativity is the only option given just a metric (assuming general covariance, without which one
could hide other entities using preferred coordinates) and without higher derivatives. Like-
wise for Nordstro¨m-Einstein-Fokker (massless) scalar gravity, the conformally flat geometry
gives only one choice, hence arguably explaining the field equations. What is the One True
Geometry for massive scalar gravity? Is it the flat metric ηµν giving the Poincare´ symmetries
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of Special Relativity? 90% of it is chronogeometrically observable, while the remaining 10%
(volumes) are at least indirectly observable using long-range gravitational observations. Or
is the One True Geometry the curved (conformally flat) metric gµν manifested materially by
rods and clocks, which are made of matter fields u? Is it both? No answer explains the field
equations, adequately summarized by the schematic Lagrangian
LNord[gµν ] + Lmass[g, η] + Lmatter[gµν , u].
The mass terms (there is not just one as in [Freund and Nambu, 1968], but many, much like
the spin 2 case [Ogievetsky and Polubarinov, 1965] at least prima facie) are
Lmass =
m2
64piG
[ √−g
w − 1 +
√−g w√−η1−w
w(1− w) −
√−η
w
]
[Pitts, 2011a, Pitts, 2011b]. Even if one accepts that as the One True Geometry a bimetric
geometry, that doesn’t explain the specific w, or why matter u sees no hint of the original
volumes
√−η. The latter is explained by universal coupling. It is unclear that anything
but the field equation itself can explain why one specific w is selected. But the explanatory
priority of the field equations over geometry is just what Brown was at pains to show. Hence
massive scalar gravity is a good example for the constructivist claim that the field equations
are explanatorily prior to the geometry.
8 Conclusion
If one takes the engagement with non-minimal coupling and multi-geometry theories at
the end of Brown’s book as the interpretive key, then one finds a fundamental issue that
has only intermittently been recognized previously in space-time philosophy. The issue
is crucial because otherwise space-time philosophy is simply mute when confronted with
many theories that could have been true, or even might yet be true. Critiques of Brown’s
work have tended to ignore multi-geometry theories. The new example of massive scalar
gravity shows that space-time realism doesn’t work well even within the canon. The possible
multiplicity of geometries in a theory and resulting greater multiplicity of how the ingredients
can be employed shows that laws are indeed explanatorily prior to geometry. The key
example of massive scalar gravity is the sort of theory that doesn’t arise at all readily within
General Relativity-shaped imaginations but arises very easily within imaginations expanded
by particle physics. Hence particle physics is a key neglected ingredient for space-time
philosophy.
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